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2Abstract
Cyber is one of the newest frontiers we face as a modern society. There 
are many unknowns when it comes to this intangible platform that has 
become shared globally. Political Science takes an interest in cyber because 
today it is used as a battle ground for attackers on the international scale. Our 
understanding of cyber warfare is still emerging, and much scholarship fails 
to discuss the usage of the United States’ use of such weapons. This paper 
goes beyond a discussion of coders and hackers leaking into government data 
and instead focuses on the evidence of cyber as a weapon in world politics. 
Through three qualitative case studies, I will reveal the use of cyber for 
informational, psychological, and physical endeavors globally.
Introduction
On March 16th, 2018 Samantha Raphelson with NPR reported on 
accusations from the Department of Homeland Security on Russian 
involvement in various cyber-attacks on US power grids. The report 
released by DHS emphasized the imminent cyber threats and described 
them as attacks on energy, nuclear, water, aviation, manufacturing, and 
commercial facilities within the United States, perpetrated by actors from 
around the world.1 One investigation detailed in the DHS report referred to 
the findings of American cybersecurity firm, Symantec, regarding a group 
named Dragonfly that broke into core operations of energy companies in the 
US and Europe.2 Additionally, DHS official, Amit Yoran, describes other 
1 Raphelson Samantha, “Report Russian Hackers Had the Ability to Shut Down U.S. 
Power Plants.” National Public Radio (March 16, 2018)
2 Ibid
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3foreign attacks such as Russian meddling in public infrastructure and the 
2016 election as “unprecedented and extraordinary” in the report.3 Officials 
from the DHS as well as heads of cybersecurity companies stress the ability 
of Russians to interfere with critical US infrastructure, stating they have 
already employed attacks as far back as last March. Such findings prove the 
existence of cyber as a weapon.
The release of the DHS report represents change because it is the 
first time the United States government has openly held foreign actors 
accountable for a cyber-attack. The DHS report also discusses an imminent 
or impending threat using cyber weapons, which represents a shift in warfare 
to methods outside traditional means. This article specifically focuses on the 
open accusations and warning from the DHS on Russian attacks in various 
industries such as those on power grids in Texas.4 Raphelson’s story makes 
it apparent that security officials fear Russian attacks like those made on 
Ukrainian industries just two years earlier that were also mentioned in her 
article. However, it is important to contextualize these events. the United 
States continues to be a world power, leveraging its influence and capabilities 
to achieve certain goals. With this background in mind, the released DHS 
report become questionable, leading us to contemplate the real capabilities of 
the United States.
Yet this DHS report is important for world politics because the new 
strategies and intelligence stipulated by the United States will influence the 
actions of states all around the world. In addition, it poses the United States 
at the receiving end of a threat, which suggests cybersecurity is a top concern 
for the US and future policy decisions. This is the first time the United States 
has accused foreign actors such as Russia for outright interference in industry 
and political happenings and is momentous in the formation of future policy.5 
In addition, the DHS report does not address the fact the United States has 
been involved in and contemplated cyber-attacks such as those on the Iranian 
power grid.6 The open discussion on cyber as a domain of war will change 
world politics forever as new weapons and methods enters the forefront 
of warfare. The report also does not consider accepted norms such as US 
military strength and its increased presence abroad, which leads me to ask the 
following research question, how does the United States utilize cyber as an 
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
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4offensive weapon in world politics? I will answer this question by analyzing 
effects on environment, human rights, and labor standards.
Conventional Wisdom
The contemporary perceptions surrounding cyber threats is that most 
Americans are not confident in the United States’ security capabilities. 
According to a Pew Research Center public opinion poll, seventy percent of 
Americans believe the United States will experience a major cyber-attack on 
public infrastructure within the next five years.7 The same study found that 
only thirteen percent of participants feel that the United States government is 
“very” prepared for a cyber-attack. In addition, a poll performed by Gallup 
found that seventy-three percent of American adults ranked cyber-terrorism 
as a top three critical threat to US interests.8 These two public opinion polls 
reflect the common feeling of insecurity amongst US citizens when it comes 
to matters of cyber. These findings present the conventional wisdom that the 
United States is not prepared for a cyber-attack or that the military has yet 
developed the tools to combat such threats.
However, the current conventional wisdom surrounding US cyber 
threats is extremely misleading. Most Americans are unaware of the 
capabilities the United States has developed and has already utilized. My 
research challenges the conventional wisdom regarding cybersecurity by 
exposing the uses of cyber as a weapon by the United States itself. Although 
common rhetoric puts the United States at the hands of foreign cyber threats, 
it is vital to understand that the United States remains a global power and 
is willing to utilize cyber in international politics. The released DHS report 
mentioned earlier might fuel paranoia amongst US citizens, but my research 
challenges the idea that the United States will be the victim of a crippling 
cyber-attack.
Case Study: Informational Cyber Tactics
Information warfare has been a legitimate strategy of the United States’ 
military for decades and continues to be applied to new domains of warfare 
such as cyber. Unlike armed warfare, information warfare might take on 
more discrete forms and will always hold a political target. For instance, a 
Congressional Research Service Report defines information warfare through 
7 “Americans and Cybersecurity,” Pew Research Center (January 26, 2017)
8 “Americans Cite Cyberterrorism Among Top Three Threats to U.S.” Gallup 
(February 10, 2016)
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5defensive and offensive operations such as “propaganda, misinformation, 
and disinformation.”9 Today, most information warfare is through cyber 
in the form of “botnets” or computers that are infected with a malicious 
software that can be used without the owner’s knowledge. Social media has 
also become a contemporary platform through which information can be 
amplified to send a specific message and generate attitudes or confusion.10 
Social media is a perfect channel for information warfare because this 
strategy seeks to intensify the “fog and friction” or uncertainties each side 
experiences during times of war and peace by achieving political goals and 
controlling information.11 Cyber has become the easiest means through 
which the United States can exercise information warfare, as new strategies 
of attack have been developed to include this domain. The Department of 
Defense has revealed and defined cyber operations to include activities 
such as “Cyber Network Attacks” which seek to “disrupt, deny, degrade or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks.”12 CNAs 
became an official part of cyber strategy when the Secretary of Defense, 
William Cohen, gave the NSA the authority to develop CNA techniques in 
1997. Additionally, DOD policy outlines that the United States will employ 
a physical or non-physical attack “to provide support for full spectrum 
dominance.”13 Secretive documents such as DOD directives imply that the 
United States military and government do have the capability for offensive 
cyberwar. Moreover, the United States is ready and extremely willing to 
utilize cyber as a means for informational gain or stealing.
Through my research, I have found several pieces of evidence that 
demonstrate the bridge between cyber and information warfare the United 
States military has attempted to build. In 1997, William Black Jr. was 
appointed as the Special Assistant for Information Warfare and wrote the 
piece, “Thinking Out Loud about Cyberspace” for the National Security 
Agency.14 Black emphasizes the recurring need for cyber technology in 
the NSA and the Informational Warfare unit itself at the time. This once-
9 Name redacted, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45142 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018)
10 Ibid
11 Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, Princeton University Press, June 1, 1989.
12 William B. Black, National Security Agency, “Thinking Out Loud About 
Cyberspace,” Cryptolog, XXIII,1 (Spring 1997). Secret.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
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6classified piece is an early indication of the integration of information 
warfare into the cyber domain. The National Security Agency in conjunction 
with other defensive units concluded that the primary method of conducting 
war in cyberspace is through Informational War tactics. In 1997, the NSA 
predicted the exploitation of computers and networks, which are troves of 
information, and set the agenda to include cyber a means of information 
dominance by exploring the term “cyber weapons.” Offensive weapons 
for information war outlined by the NSA include “viruses, worms, logic 
bombs, Trojan horses, spoofing, masquerading, and ‘trap’ doors.”15 Although 
these are types of software and not a physical weapon, they have the power 
to destroy any nation’s information infrastructure completely if utilized 
properly.16
In this case study, I will detail various instances of the use and 
development of cyber weapons for informational gains by the United States. 
In his book, Dark Territory, Fred Kaplan tracks the emergence of cyber units 
within the United States government such as the Department of Defense 
and the National Security Agency as well as their functions and strategies. 
These agencies work together to achieve goals that include acquiring 
information from interest nations or areas to promote an outcome ideal to 
the United States interests. A little-known US target to cyber-attacks was the 
Serbian military. In 1977, the US along with other NATO forces created the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) to enforce the end of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
war after the replacement of the president, Slobodan Milosevic.17 This special 
force was enlisted to hunt war criminals and work in conjunction with US 
based agencies such as the NSA and J-39, a secret unit within the Pentagon’s 
Joint Staff.18  On March 24, 1999 NATO forces began a bombing campaign 
against the Federation of Yugoslavia which sought to ethnically cleanse the 
Balkan region. During the attack, US forces relied on spoofing techniques to 
intercept and stop military communications from the enemy. The specialized 
J-39 unit commanded hacks on the Serbian air defense system, sending 
false directions to aircrafts and relaying wrong informational updates. 
The changes were slight so that the Serbs could not detect their computer 
systems were interrupted by US commanded B-2 Spirit stealth bombers. 
“Spoofing” is when a person or program successfully imitates another by 
15 Ibid
16 Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory(New York: Simon Schuster, 2016)
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
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7sending false data to the recipient and this is a basic example of how cyber 
is utilized as a tool by the US to gain a political/military advantage. This 
military operation ended in the bombing of Yugoslavia and allowed for US/
NATO peacekeeping forces to enter the region. Since its inception in 1977, 
the SFOR and joint agencies have developed such offensive capabilities for 
informational gain in both military and civilian operations. 
David Sanger with The New York Times reported in 2012 of another 
virus, Flame, in his article, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against 
Iran.”19 Flame illustrates a contemporary example of the US ability to steal, 
copy, and share information. This code was a continuation of the original 
US-created code named Duqu, which was a reconnaissance tool that could 
copy blueprints of Iran’s nuclear program. The newer Flame virus sent a 
visible code onto Iranian officials’ computer to essentially steal information 
on Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.20 No single state has claimed 
Duqu or Flame, but later findings suggest it was the work of the United 
States and Israel. The nature of these events insinuates a physical attack since 
a USB was manually inserted into these individuals’ personal computers.21 
However, physical damage was just a secondary objective for these two 
cyber operations. Flame and Duqu were utilized as a covert method to steal 
information from Iran. It had the sole purpose of achieving a political goal 
just as any informational warfare operation. These instances prove to be 
unique, however. Cyber was the domain of warfare for this operation and 
in an effort to remain secretive; the code could not be traced to an original 
creator. This attack was successful, in that the computers affected were 
useless or had their information copied and shared.22 Such events prove the 
efficiency and emergence of cyber offensive tools to fulfill tasks such as 
information gathering to achieve political gains.
Case Study: Psychological Cyber Tactics
Psychological warfare and its methods fall under the “umbrella” 
of information warfare. The psychological war strategy conducts covert 
missions or attacks to gain information. PSYOPS, or psychological 
19 David Sanger, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran,” The New York 
Times(June 1, 2012)
20 Ibid
21 Nicole Perlroth, “Researchers Find Clues in Malware,” The New York Times (May 
30TH, 2012).
22 Ibid
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8operations, has become an integral part of military defensive and offensive 
plans. The Department of Defense directives define PSYOPS as operations 
“meant to induce foreign attitudes favorable to the originators cause.”23 
Psychological warfare is not a new phenomenon and was a powerful 
tool throughout United States history. For example, during the Cold War, 
President Eisenhower deployed pamphlets and boosted programs such as 
Voice of America in Europe to change attitudes toward the Soviet Union 
through such offensive psychological warfare tactics.24 Eisenhower’s success 
reflects the possibilities and effectiveness psychological warfare can achieve 
if aided with new technology such as cyber. 
PSYOPS came to the forefront of operations such as those during the 
Iraq War under the Bush Administration, which pushed for informational 
gains and the use of psychological war to attain new material and altern 
negative perceptions of the West.25 A small number of cyber uses were 
stipulated by the military and US government but were not employed. 
These included possible plans in which an individual can have access to a 
weapon or tool that would target a specific computer or system and modify 
its functions/ information it receives and spreads. Other plans detailed how 
a PSYOP team could develop a website for an audience in Iraq so that 
behaviors can change indirectly.26
My research indicates that psychological tactics have played a large 
role in United States military operations in the past and will continue to do 
so in the future. The United States Army Field Manual explicitly states that 
PSYOPS “are meant to change the behavior of a foreign target audience to 
support U.S. national objectives.”27 In 2005, the tasks of PSYOPS soldiers 
were written to be to develop, design, produce, distribute, disseminate, and 
evaluate psychological war materials and tools.28  Cyber can be used in the 
23 Name redacted, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45142 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018)
24 Kenneth A. Osgood, Form Before Substance Eisenhower Commitment to 
Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy, Diplomatic History
25 Christopher J. Lamb, “Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from 
Recent Operational Experience,” (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 
September 2005).
26 Ibid
27 Department of the Army. “Tactical Psychological Operations: Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures,” (Manual, Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 28, 
2005)
28 Ibid
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9form of social media and the Internet, for example, by interfering with the 
interactions and information an individual receives. The Internet has become 
increasingly utilized as a means of achieving psychological war through 
cyber. The United States has ownership of the Internet and has utilized it as a 
tool for democracy in nations all over the world. For example, after bombing 
Yugoslavia with NATO forces, the US decided to allow Serbians to maintain 
access to the internet to allow the people to see the atrocities committed in 
Kosovo by the Milosevic regime.29 Additionally, the Serbian government 
attempted to stop the independent radio station, B92, from organizing 
protests. When this occurred, B92’s transmission was broadcasted to the 
Internet and relayed back to Serbia by the British Broadcasting Channel and 
Voice of America radio stations.30 This case demonstrates the US’s attempt 
to bolster Serbian support after an exploitative and violent US venture and 
displayed the ease of utilizing cyber for a political gain through an everyday 
institution such as the Internet.
Similarly, a contemporary use of psychological warfare through means 
of cyber can be seen through Operation Iraqi Freedom during the Iraq 
war. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States employed various 
methods to gain US support in Iraq against troubling political figures such 
as Saddam Hussein.31 During this operation, broadcast messages were sent 
from Air Force plane, EC-130E and from Navy ships operating on the 
Persian Gulf. These messages were accompanied by a barrage of emails, 
faxes, and cell phone calls to numerous Iraqi leaders.32 The message being 
sent by US forces was to abandon Saddam Hussein. In hopes of changing 
public opinion, the US military led Operation Iraqi Freedom utilizing cyber 
and psychological warfare. Military Deception or “MILDEC” is a strategy 
used by the United States army that relies on sending false signals to the 
enemy. Deception is a primary part of psychological warfare in that it keeps 
29 Briscoe; Jon Swartz, “Administration Drops Idea of Blocking Serb Net Sites,” 
The San Francisco Chronicle, 15 May 1999: in Eden-Webster Passports/Lexis-Nexis 
[database online], World News library.
30 David J. Rothkopf, “Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of Power in the 
Information Age,” Journal of International Affairs 51 (Spring 1998): in Columbia, 
International Affairs Online [database online], (9 January 2001).
31 Catherine Dale, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and 
Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. RL 34387, (Washington DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2008)
32 Ibid
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the enemy or public unaware of reality or of future outcomes.33 During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States used deceptive methods such as 
the Navy’s Tactical Air Launched Decoy system. This tool could divert fire 
from Iraqi air defenses using a digital capability, making aircrafts unsure of 
the target or source of attacks in the sky. The United States’ attempts display 
that offensive methods, coupled with discrete operations such as building 
fake websites, yield the strength and magnitude to influence the political 
objectives/opinions of individuals.
Psychological operations are critical to the United States’ endeavors 
and is deployed abroad and domestically. Today, the US counts on the Media 
Operations Center at Fort Bragg, which is accountable for printing and 
disseminating audio, video, and print psychological operation products.34 
Since the actual production of psychological warfare materials are done 
domestically, there must be an efficient and overt method of spreading 
this information abroad. Cyber is a primary means of deploying such 
materials through social media and satellite communications.35 Additionally, 
Deployable Audio Production Systems is a technology widely used in 
PSYOPS. Missions can be carried out with SOMS B vehicles have the 
capacity to create audio and video in the air which can then be shared 
using DAP technology. One of the first uses of this technology was in 
Afghanistan (2001) when The Commando Solo aircraft transmitted pro 
US radio broadcasts.36 Since its first use, the Commando Solo, alongside 
SOMS B, have been vital to US interests in bolstering support in the Middle 
East. These are just a handful of cyber technologies that make the spread of 
psychological warfare materials efficient and possible beyond conventional 
methods. 
Case Study: Physical Cyber Tactics
The Department of Defense defines the cyberspace domain as consisting 
of three interdependent “layers” including the physical, the logical, and 
the cyber persona. “Physical” refers to the environment of devices and the 
33 Clay Wilson, Information Operations and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related 
Policy Issues, CRS Report No. RL31787, (Washington DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2006)
34 Christopher J. Lamb, “Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from 
Recent Operational Experience,” (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 
September 2005).
35 Ibid
36 Ibid
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geographical location of these systems.37 This is the network of people and 
materials. Therefore, a physical attack can also be on a computer or a system 
that causes a degradation of the material item itself.38 This is a strategy that 
carries a human aspect because it requires one’s presence and compliance 
to attack another entity. Past events of physical cyber-attacks suggest these 
types of operations carry a specific target and are motivated by a material or 
political gain since the nature is destructive and deliberate. A contemporary 
example of this would be the Stuxnet malware which stunted Iran’s 
development of nuclear weapons by stopping uranium enrichment processes 
in nuclear facilities.
In 2010, fifteen plants across Iran reported technical failures and 
difficulties in nuclear plant processes. These malfunctions were later found 
to be the result of “Stuxnet,” a malicious software and the first known “cyber 
weapon.”39 This event is also considered the first “act of force” using cyber. 
Stuxnet was the only malicious software of its kind, specifically designed to 
interact with and destroy a nuclear Industrial Control System. The Stuxnet 
code targets a Microsoft application that the nuclear ICS devices use daily 
during uranium enrichment operations. That being said, the virus can enter 
devices through a USB or gaps in internet connection. However, the nature of 
Stuxnet implied that it must have been implemented in person at the facilities 
or by an insider. Stuxnet is significant because it was the first code that set 
out to inhibit the production of nuclear materials. It was also a part of a larger 
campaign for offensive cyber operations entitled, Operation Olympic Games. 
This operation began under the Bush Administration in 2006 and continued 
under Obama as a cyber-campaign against Iran, which was made possible 
with the help of US friendly, Israel.40 
Operation Olympic Games was a secretive joint effort made between the 
US and Israeli governments to cripple and destabilize Iran’s nuclear program 
entirely. Cyber was the chosen domain of warfare for this operation and 
cyber weapons were central to the plan of Olympic Games.41 This revelation 
37 Catherine Theohary and Anne Harrington, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and 
Plans: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R43848 (Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service, 2015)
38 Ibid
39 David Sanger, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran,” The New York 
Times(June 1, 2012)
40 David Sanger, Confront and Conceal (Broadway Books, June 2012)
41 Ibid
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starkly contrasts the notion that the United States is a victim to cyber threats 
given its role in the first contemporary mass cyber-attack. Eventually, cyber 
and tech experts from around the world revealed the dark components of the 
virus. This code held features described by scholars as “dual warheads,” 
that remain dormant and send false signals to computer systems signaling 
that things are running normally when they are not.42 The code is a weapon 
in every way given its precise duty and properties. One part was designed 
to specifically command 984 machines linked together. This is the same 
number of downed uranium- enrichment centrifuges, inspectors at the Natanz 
plant reported following the attack.43 With these attributes, Stuxnet was 
truly the first cyber-weapon, enabling a physical attack on a political target. 
The realities of the Stuxnet attack contradicts the notion that the US is only 
developing weapons and not utilizing harmful offensive components. Stuxnet 
was formulated not to only send a message, but to destroy the enemy target 
just as any military operation might seek to do.
Stuxnet was used as a weapon against Iran for the advancement of US 
political goals in that it delayed Iran’s nuclear program by downing almost 
10,000 Industrial devices. Furthermore, I have found several manifestations 
of the intent and use of cyber weapons as a part of a political/material 
gain by the United States. In 2017, The United States-Israel Cybersecurity 
Cooperation Enhancement Act passed the House of Representatives. This 
bill requires The Department of Homeland Security to create a fund limited 
to US and Israeli citizens for research and development on cyber protection, 
response, and strategies.44 The adopted amendment provides for a “Cyber 
Center of Excellence,” for the development of new capabilities. This 
example directly displays the intent to continue developing and using cyber 
strategies or weapons on a political target.45 The strategic relationship with 
Israel can be applied to any other country the US seeks intelligence from in 
developing new capabilities of warfare such as cyber weapons. This update 
indicated that the US is willing to negotiate and work with other nations to 
42 Paul Kerr, John Rollins, Catherine Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: 
Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability, CRS Report No. R41524 (Washington 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010)
43 Ibid
44 [1]U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Cybersecurity Cooperation 
Enhancement Act. 2017. 115thCongress.
45 The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, “Bill Summary Cybersecurity 
Cooperation Enhancement Act,” (March 2018)
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create offensive cyber strategies on specific political targets such as Iran. 
Through my research, I have found the intent of the United States has not 
changed since the inception of Operation Olympic Games in 2006. These are 
just a few examples that have been exposed as linked to US intelligence and 
military operations but there are still many unknowns.
Implications
With the emergence of cyber, leaders are faced with new issues and 
challenges their predecessors did not have to contemplate. Stuxnet is an 
important example for world politics in that it was the first well-known 
cyber weapon and was able to conduct a physical threat and influence later 
events. I believe the United States must take accountability for developing 
these technologies. The United States set a precedent by utilizing cyber for 
physical, psychological, and informational gains and must be responsible for 
the repercussions. Both states and independent actors have learned from the 
US example. As cyber becomes a legitimate domain of war, it is inevitable 
states will compete for the most powerful cyber weapons. This leads me 
to question, just how far the US and other states are willing to go for cyber 
dominance. History reveals that weapons such as the nuclear bomb had 
the power to change history forever. I can imagine a cyber-weapon of this 
magnitude as being possible in the future. 
Addressing US cyber offensive strategies is vital in recognizing the 
power and influence of the United States in areas such as military strength. 
Although common rhetoric puts the United States at the hands of foreign 
cyber threats, it is vital to understand that the United States remains a 
global power and is willing to utilize cyber in international politics. The 
US has proven its willingness to use cyber weapons through these three 
case studies. As cyber weapons are increasingly developed and utilized, the 
public remains unaware. Today, top news stories detail foreign involvement 
in the US political process through the Internet and social media outlets. 
These recent events signal that cyber-attacks or war is increasingly viable 
and can be hidden for long periods of time. This leads me to ask the future 
capabilities of sabotage by the United States and foreign actors as well 
in addition to attacks the public might never know about. Therefore, it is 
important that instances such as Stuxnet are discussed for security and the 
formation of future policy or norms.
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